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The .Nature and Significance of Groups·

Donelson R. Forsyth

.
Abstract
An understanding of group counseling requires an understanding of groups themselves, their basic
nature and processes. Given that human beings are a social species and spend their lives in groups
rather than alone, an individual-level analysis of adjustment, well-being, and treatment, with its focus on
internal, psychological processes, should be supplemented by a group-level analysis. The defining
features of a group are relationships linking a substantial number of members, boundaries,
interdependence, structure, cohesion, and entitatlvity (perceived groupness): and groups with .more of
these features are more Influential than other forms of association, such as social networks. The
chapter reviews a number of group-level processes that influence mem~ers' adjustment, including
loneliness, ostracism, social support, socialization, social Identity, and performance, before
recommending a synthesis of the individual- and group-level perspectives in a multilevel analysis of
human development, adjustment, and potential.
Keywords: lndlvldual-level analysis; group-level analysis; cohesion; entitativity; social networks;
loneliness, ostracism, social support.

People, no matter what they are doing-working,
relaxing, studying. exercising, worshiping, playing,
socializing, watching entertainment, or sleepingare usually in a group rather than alone. Some
people seem to keep to themselves, but a preference
tor solitude is considered unusual by most; sociality
rs far more typical, for most people live out their
lives in groups, around groups, and seeking out new
groups. ffumans arc: so group-oricmc:d that at every
turn we encounter groups. No one knows for cer·
iain how many groups exist at th1s moment, but
given the number of people on the planet and their
proclivity to form groups, 30 billion is a conserva·
tM: estimate.
Groups are ubiquitous, not only in the context
of day-to-day living but also in counseling settings.
Group counseling, by definition, is an intervention
that in some way infolves groups and group processes. In schools counselors work with small groups

of students as they deal with problems of devdoprnent, adjusrment, and achievement. Peers meet co
offer each other suppon and wise counsel as they
cope with problems they share in common. Hospital
counselors meet with families to help them deal
with the consequences of illness, disease, and death.
Meneal health professionals in a range of settings
work with people in groups to set new goals for
adjusunent and help their clients learn the skills
they need to connect with others. In communities
social workers ~d organizers meet with residents to
share information and identify solutions to commu·
nal issues. Consultants and trainers in organizations
teach clients the skills they need to sec realistic goals
and to identify the steps they muse take to reach
them. Even when working with single individuals,
the influence of groups cannot be ignored, for in
many cases individuals' difficulties and satisf.a.ctions
are intimately linked to groups: those to which they
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belong, those that they are seeking to join, those
that exclude them, and even those that reject and
denigrate them.
This chapter is based on a single assumption: To
understand group counseling-and, more generally,
to understand people-one must understand groups
themselves, their basic nature and processes. All too
often a group-level explanation of people's thoughts,
emotions, and actions is overlooked in the search
for an explanation of the causes of dysfunction and
adjustment, just as a group approach to treatment is
viewed as a second-best choice compared to an individualistic intervention. A truly multilevel approach,
however, requires the integration of many levels of
analysis in the development of a comprehensive
theory of human adjustment and treatment. The
chapters in this handbook stress the group rather
than the individual not because the group level is
viewed as more important than the individual but
rather because the individual level has received
favorable treatment for so long that an analysis that
takes into account group-level processes is overdue.
This chapter examines three related questions.
First, what does the analy'sis of groups and their
dynamics contribute to an overall understanding of
human behavior? For those who, by tradition, adopt
an individual-centered approach to understanding
individuals' thoughts, actions, and emotions, what
does a multilevel perspective that recognizes that
individuals arc also members of larger social units
offer? Second, what are the unique charaeteristics of
groups that provide the foundation for their psychological and interpersonal significance? From small,
problem-focused, and highly structured psychoeducational groups co large and geqgrn.phically scattered
community groups. groups come in a staggering
~nment of shapes and sizes. What qualities do
these various groups have in common, and what distinguishes them from other social aggregations, such
as netw0~ks of associations and communities? Third,
what is the conncaion bcrween the individual and
the group? If individuals arc not isolates but rather
more frequently mcmben ofgroups, in what ways do
these groups influence the individual members, and
how do the members in turn influence their groups?

'The Reality of Groups
Emile Durkheim (1897/1966), at the end of the
nineteenth century, presented evidence that suggested that suicide results more from interpersonal
causes than intrapsychic ones. People did not take
their own lives, he maintained, because of psychological maladjustment or delusion but rather when
'20

the groups that they belonged to no longer provided
them with reliable alliances with others or regulative
support systems. He maintained that groups provide a buffer against the stresses of daily life events,
and as a result, those who were closely associated
with traditional integrative groups enjoyed greater
happiness and health Qoiner, Brown, & Wingate,
2005; c£ Kushner & Sterk, 2005).
Many scholars of that period agreed with
Durkheim's idea that groups profoundly influence their members (e.g., Le Bon, 1895/1960;
McDougall, 1908). Others, however, took a different position. Allport (1924), for example, questioned the need to look beyond psychological
processes when explaining why people acted as they
did. Groups, according to Allport, were not even
real; and he felt that the behavior of individuals in
groups could be understood by studying the psychology of the group members since "the actions of
all are nothing more than the sum of the actions of
each taken separately.. (p. 5). He is reputed to have
said lfyou can't trip over a group" (Pepitone, 1981).
Vestiges of Allport's skepcicism continue to
influence theorists' and researchers' willingness to
consider group-level concepts when explaining maladaptive and adaptive processes. Although most, in
principle, admit.that groups are influential, in practice when they search for the causes of behavior and
when they make choices about the best way to solve
personal and interpersonal problems, they adopt an
individual-centered perspective rather than a groupccntered one. This section examines the sources and
the ramifications of the tendency to think individual first and group second, in theory, research, and
practice.

Perceiving /ntlivUluals and Groups
The well-known face-vase visual illusion can be
construed as depicdng either a vase or the faces of
two individuals looking at each other. Illustrating
the figure-ground Gestalt principle of perception,
when people report seeing a vase, the image of the
vase becomes the figure and the individuals become
the ground. Conversely, when people report seeing
N{O individuals looking at each otjler, the fuces
become figure and the vase retreats into the background. The image hides a third image however:
two-person group, whose members are facing one
another. Yee, the group is rarely noticed.
In terms of Gestalt principles of perceptions,
groups are the ground, whereas individuals are the
figure. The most famous paiµting in the world
depicts a single individual. The number ofwords in

THE NATURE. AND SIGNIFICANCE OF GROUPS

languages that can be used to describe individuals
and their personality chatacteristics is substantialNorman (1963), for example, identified 2,800 traitdescriptive adjectives in his study of personalitybut how many words describe qualities that arc
specific to groups? Groups arc not generally
described as jolly, brave, playful, assertive, nosey,
sensual, cool, reasonable, or stingy; but individuals
arc. Concepts that are used to describe qualities of
individuals, such as personality, needs, intelligence,
and self, have made their way easily into everyday
language; but concepts that were developed to
describe aspects of groups-for example, Cattcll's
(1948) syntality, Bogardus's (1954) groupality, and
Moreno's (1934) sociometry-rarely find popular
acceptance. Even though people speak of such concepts as teamwork, leadership, and cliques in their
discussions of c.ontcmpociry issues, they tend co
translate these group-level processes into individualistic ones. The key ingredient for teamwork, they
-suggest, is having a particular type of personality
that stresses cooperation and communicatioh.
Leadership continues to be viewed as a personality
trait, rather than a process that emerges during
cooperative interactions. Cliques, and their negative
tendencies, are attributed to the motives of the
clique members, rather than group-level processes.
Indi"iduals, when considering the causes of
their own and ochers' behavior; are less likely to
favor an explanation that stresses group-level causes
tc:lative to one that stresses such psychological,
individualistic causes as motivations, emotions,
intentions, and personality. The well-documented
fundamental attribution error occurs because perceivers arc more likely to attribute a person's actions
to personal, individual qualities rather than external, situational forces (Ross, 1977). Evidence suggests that social perception starts with an assumption
of dispositionality; the attributor initially categorizes the behavior as one that reflects a particular
trait or quality and then uses this behavioral label to
characterize the actor. Only then, and only if he or
she has the cognitive resources and motivation to
process fully information about the situation, docs
the perceiver consider group-level causes (Gilbert,
1998). Hence, even when individuals engage in
unusual behaviors in response to an extreme degree
of group pressure, perceivers believe that actions
reflect qualities of the person rather than the group
(Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius,
2008). Perceivers also expect that individuals will
behave similarly in all groups to which they belong;
after all, if personal, individualistic qualities are the

primary causes of behavior, then group-level process
should play only a minor role in determining outcomes (Darley, 1992).
This tendency to see individuals first and groups
second may vary from one culture to another.
Western countries such as the United States and
Great Britain lean toward individualism: the equality ofseparate individuals and the rights of the individual over the group. Individuals are the center of
such societies, and their rights to private property,
to express themselves, and to engage in actions for
their own personal gain are protected and even
encouraged. Many non-Western societies, in contrast, stress collectivism. Individuals in such societies think of themselves as group members first and
individuals second and, thus, emphasize the unity
of all people in cheir group rather than each person's
individuality. Social existence is centered on group
relations, for it is the group that creates social obligations based on respect, crust, and a sense of community (friandis & Suh, 2002).
Because of these varying priorities, people raised
in individualistic cultures differ in many ways from
people raised in cultures that are based on collectivism. To speak in general terms (for people vary considerably within any given culture), individuals in
Asian, western European, African, and Middle
Eastern countries tend to be more loyal to thc:ir
group and more suspicious of individuals who do
not bdong to their group. Collectivistic culrures
also tend to be more hierarchical in organization,
and they stress conformity and obedience co authority. Individuals' self-concepts also differ in individualistic and collectivistic contexts, with greater
emphasis on personal identity in the former and
greater emphasis on social identity (e.g., roles, membership, rdations) in the latter. Triandis and his colleagues illustrated this difference by asking people
from various countries co describe themselves. As
they expected, these self-descriptions contained
more references to social identities-membership in
groups, roles in society, ethnicity-when people
were from collectivistic countries (e.g., Japan,
China). They discovered that some individuals from
the People's Republic of China described themselves
exclusively in interpersonal terms, whereas some US
resident.S used only personal descriptors: They had
no elements of a group-level identity (Triandis,
McCusker, & Hui, 1990).

Levels ofAnalym
Researchers, theorists, and practitioners, whether
they are psychologists, social workers, consultants,
FORSYTH
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counselors, or clinicians, accept as givens some core
assumptions about humans and their basic nature.
These guiding assumptions, far from being biases,
are instead useful heuristics, for they provide the
means of dealing with the countless alternative and
correct interpretations of the evidence and issues
that they must confront and interpret in their work.
Coan (1968), Rosenberg and Gara (1983), and
Watson (1967) present a sampling of the divergent
asswnptions that have characterized various
approaches in psychology since the field's inception.
Arc unconscious processes influential determinants
of behavior, or are actions primarily the result of
reinforcement mechanisms? Is behavior caused by
forces present in the immediate external environment or historical factors whose force is still felt in
the distant future? Can psychological processes be
broken down into specific elements, or is a holistic
approach that avoids analysis more informative?
Watson (1967) suggested that these "prescriptions"
serve to orient researchers, theorists, and practitioners when they conceptualize problems and search
for solutions.
THB INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE

One of the most endurin,g prescriptions within the
field of psychology is psychogenicism: the focus on
the internal, psychological determinants of bchavio!. With behaviorists providing a notable exception,
the theorists who provided the foundations for contemporary psychology offered models that included
reference to the strucrurc of personality. dynamic
intrapsycl\ic mechanisms, and the relationships
between the individual's particular qualities and his
or her behavior. Adler, Freud, Jung, Horney, Maslow,
Murray, and others were generalists; but at the core
their theories assumed that personality, needs, motivations, and other psychogenic mechanisms play a
pivotal role in adjustment and dysfunction. The psychogenic orientation was summarized by Urban
(1983, p. 163), who argued strongly that when psychologists look for causes outside of the individual
they"deny and distort the essential quality ofhuman
existence. Everything of significance with regard to
this entire process occurs within the inner or subjective experience of the individual." Psychogenicism is
also compatible with general mdogmism, in which
behaviors arc attributed to a host of internal processes such as genetic factors, past events, and biological processes. Psychogenic approaches assume
that psychological states mediate the relationship
between the external world and the person's reaction
to it (Forsyth & Leary, 1991).
2.2.

THE GROUP-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE

The individual-level approach suggested by psychogenicism contrasts with a group-level approach.
'This orientation assumes that ifone wishes to understand individuals, one roust understand groups. As
a highly social species, humans arc rarely separated
from contact and interaction with other humans,
and in most cases these connections occur in a group
context. In co~equence, groups and their processes
have a profound impaet on individuals; they shape
actions, thoughts, and feelings. Although people
often consider their cognitive ruminations, including thoughts, decisions, attitudes, and values, to be
private and personal, these are shaped by the groups
to which they belong. Sherif (1936) and Asch
(1957). in early demonstrations of the impact of a
group on members' mast basic judgments, discovered that people will base their decisions on the
statements made by other group members rather
the evidence of their own senses. Groups prompt
their members to endorse certain ideas and attitudes, and even nonconformists will eventually rake
on the standards of the groups to which they belong
(Newcomb, 1943). People also process information
eollectively, through discussion and other group
communication processes, so such basic cognitive
processes as planning, evaluating, judging, de~ision
malcing, and problem solving are made, not by indi~
viduals, but by groups (Kerr & Tindale, 2004).
Groups also influence members' emotions, in
both direct and indirect ways. As Schachter and
Singer's (1962) classic study ofhow people label their
physiological states indicates, people often rdy on
cues in the group setting to decide if they are happy.
sad, angry, or frightened., Emotions are also sometimes contagious in groups, with the feelings of one
individual passing rapidly from one member of the
group to the next (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007).
Crowds and mobs, for example, often experience
waves of strong emotions, to the point that external
observers often fed that such gro~ps act as if they
possess a shared, or collective, conscious. Even members of more commonplace and highly structured
groups, such as work groups and sports teams,
become more and more similar in their overall mood
the longer they remain together (Kelly, 2004).
Groups also influence members' actions and
reaaions. As Durkheim concluded, people respond
very differently when they are isolated rather than
integrated in a group, and this shift has been documented time and again in studies of a wide variety
of behaviors in many different situations. Young
children imitate the way their playmates dress, talk,
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and ace (Adler, Kless, & Adler, 1992). Older children's actions are guided by their family's influence,
until by adolescence the peer group becomes the
primary determiner of behaviors (Harris, 1995).
Groups can, in some cases, change people's behavior
so dramatically that their behavior in a group bears
po relationship to their behavior when isolated. The
early group psychologists may have exaggerated the
apparent madness ofpeople when immersed in large
crowds, but contemporary researchers have confirmed the discontinuity effect: In many cases the
actions of individuals when in groups cannot be
predicted by studying the qualities and actions of
ea~ individual group member (Wlldschut, Pinter,
Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003).
A group-level approach also assumes that information will be lost, or at least overlooked, if the
focus is solely on individuals rather chan the larger
social wtlt since groups possess characteristics "that
cannot be reduced to or described as qualities of itS
participants" (Sanddands & St. Clair, 1993, p. 443).
A group's cohesiveness, for example, is more than the
mere attraction of each individual member for one
another (Hogg, 1992). Individuals may not like each
other on a personal level, yet when they form a group
they experience powerful feelings of unity and esprit
de .corps. As Lcwin's (1951) Gestalt orientation
argued that a group is greater than the sum of its
parts, so it cannot be understood through piecemeal,
individual-only, analysis.

engages in aberrant actions, a multilevel approach
docs not stop at the micro level by considering only
the qualities, characteristics, and actions of the individual members. A multilevel approach also considers mcso-level group processes, including group
influence, cohesion, composition, and structure.
The approach also considers macro-level factors,
which are the qualities and processes of the larger
collectives chat enfold the groups, such as communities, organizations, or societies. Groups, then, are
nested at the mcso level where the bottom-up
micro-level variables meet the cop-down m~~o
lcvel variables (Forsyth, 2010).
A multilevel approach has several advantages to
a one-level-only analysis of human behavior. An
individual-level analysis stresses the causal importance of the individual's past and future and best
deals with situational factors by filtering them
through individual-level mechanisms. Because
personality, experience, attitudes, and values must
be represented within the individual, a group-levelonly analysis tends to ignore chem, choosing instead
to focus on contemporaneous causes present in
the immediate setting. The result is a model chat
suggests people are mechanistic, static, and pur·
poseless, whereas they are, in reality, motivated,
goal-seeking, and dynamic. A multilevel approach
is more theoretically egalitarian, recognizing the
causal influence of factors that range along the
individual-group-organization continuum.

THE MUITILEVEL PERSPECTIVE

The Nature of Groups

Theorists, researchers, and practitioners offer a range
of solutions to problems of human adjustment and
dysfunction. Some highlight aspects of the individual: their personalities, motivation, emotions, and
perceptions. Others focus on interpersonal factors,
such as relations with friends and relatives and group
memberships. Some stress the larger social context
by suggesting that the most important factors to
COP._sidcr arc cultural ones. These perspectives arc
often. viewed as mutually exclusive views that resist
integration. As Sarason (1981, p. 175) explained,
"built into psychology, pan of its world view, is the
polarity man and society. Call it a polarity or a
dichotomy or even a distinction, it makes it easy for
psychology to focus on one and ignore the other."
A multilevel perspective, in contrast, does not
favor a specific level of analysis when examining
quman behavior, for it argues for examining processes that range along the micro-meso-macro continuum. Asked why an individual acts altruistically,
acts in ways that create conflict with others, or

A group-level analysis argues that groups influence
their members' adjustment and mental health, but
the magnitude of this impact depends on the nature
of the group. Groups. unlike individuals, are noc all
created equal. Some aggregations of individuals
seem, intuitively, to deserve to be called "groups":
Families, gangs, suppon groups, school boards, production teams, and neighborhood associations arc
examples. Other collections of people-bystanders
to a mugging, the audience in a theater, or Internet
users arguing with one another via commentaries to
a blogger's post-may lack the defining features of a
group. But what are chose defining features?
R~'4tiomhip1

Definitions of the concept of group abound, but
most theorists would agree that a group comes into
existence when people become connected by and
within social relationships. Both Lewin (1948) and
Cartwright and Zander (1968) stressed the importance of relationships among members as the key
FORSYTH
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defining feature of a true group, with Cartwright
and Zander (1968, p. 46) concluding a "group is a
collection of individuals who have relations to one
another that make them interdependent to some
significant degree."
Groups create and sustain relationships between
individual members, but the relationships that link
che members of a group together are not of one type.
In families, for example. the relationships ace based
on kinship, but in the workplace the relationships
are based on taslNelated interdependencies. In some
groups members are friends of one another, bur in
others the members express little mutual attraction,
liking, or loving for one another. Nor are the relationships linking members of different types of
groups equally strong or enduring. Some relationships, like the links between members of a family or
a clique of close friends, are enduring ones, which
have developed over time and are based on a long
history of mutual influence and exchange. In other
cases, however, the ties between members may be
relatively weak ones rhat arc so fragile they are easily
severed. Nor need all relationships be mutual ones.
In a group of friends, for example, some members
may be liked by all the group members but these
group members may like only a subset of the group
members in return. But no matter what the nature of
the relations, a group exists when individuals are
connected to one another by some type of social tie.
Theoretically, the number of relationships
needed to create a completely interconnected
group-one where every member is linked to every
other member-is given by the equation n(n- 1)/2,
where n is the number of people in group (and if
we assume that all relationships arc mutual). A relatively small group-for example, a 12-pcrson jury
or committee--would require the development
and maintenance of 66 relationships if every
member was connected to every other member. In
consequence, in many cases the number of ties in a
group is less than the number of potential relationships. Evolutionary theorist Dunbar (2008) goes so
far as to suggest that the need to track connections
with others--to remember who can be trusted to
share. who will act in helpful ways, or who is owed a
favor and who is not-spurred the development ofa
larger brain in primates. Dunbar's social brain
hypothesis assumes that group life is more psycho·
logically demanding than a more isolated, inde·
pendent one. Moreover, given the number of
relationships that must be tracked in larger groups,
Dunbar suggests thar humans likely evolved to live
most comfortably in groups of 150 people fewer.

or
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In general, the stronger the relationships linking
members, the more influence the group has on irs
members. A young man who is part of a gang. for
example, may act in ways that the group requires
because the relationships that bind him to the group
are so numerous and so strong that the group is too
powerful to resist. In contrast, a member of a club
may break the group's attendance rules regularly
because there are few ties that bind him or her to the
group or those ties are relatively weak. As with other
relationships, such as friendships and partnerships,
the strength of the relationship is determined, in
large part, by the rewards the group provides, the
costs the rdationship incurs, and the member's
degree of commitment to the group ('Thibaut &
Kelly, 1959).

Boundaries
The rdationships that sustain a group not only link
members to one another but also define who is in the
group and who is not. A group is therefore boundar~
ied, in a psychological sense, with those who are
included in the group recognized as members and
those who are not part ofthe group excluded as nonmembers. These boundaries set the members apart
from other people, and hence, they distinguish a
group from another psychologically significant aggregate: the social network. To become part of a soda/
network, an individual need only establish a relationship of some son with a person who is already part of
the network. If persons A and B already know each
other-they are linked by a social relationship-th.en
person C can join their network by establishing a
relationship with either A or B. But a group, unlike a
network, is more than a chain of individuals joined
in dyadic pairings. Even though A and B are friends
and B and C are friends, if these individuals are
linked only in these dyadic pair-bonds, then they are
part of a social network but not a group. A group
exists when members form a relationship with the
group as a whole and when it is the group that sus·
tains, at least in part, the relationships among each of
the individual members. IfA. B, and Care not linked
to a supervening aggregate, then they arc jUst sets of
friends and not members of a group.
Groups' boundaries vary from the stable and
relatively formalized to the unstable and highly permeable. As Ziller's (1965) theory ofopen and closed
groups suggests that group membership can flucruare for various reasons: members are voted out of
the group (e.g., governing committees), members
voluntarily come and go (e.g., community service
groups), and so on. Regardless of the reasons for
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group fluctuation, open groups arc especially
unlikely to reach a state of equilibrium since mcmb.ers recognize that they may lose or relinquish their
place within the group at any time. Members of
such groups, especially those in which membership
is dependent on voting or meeting a panicular stan·
dard, arc more likely to monitor the actions of
od)ers. Ziller writes, "In the expandccj. frame of reference of the open groups in which transfers frequently occur, more accurate and more reliable
ratings of the members are possible" (1965, p. 168).
In contrast, closed-groups a{e often more cohesive as
competition for membership is irrelevant and group
m'embers anticipate future collaborations. Thus, in
closed groups, individuals are more likely to focus
on the collective narure of the group and to identify
with the group. Zillcr's theory suggests that open
gf9ups, by their very nature, are less cohesive.

Interdependence
Groqps entwine the fates of their members. As
Ca;twright and Zander (1968, p. 46) noted, it is
not just that the members are tclated to each other
but that these relationships "make them interdependent to some significant degree." Shaw (1981,
p.i454), in his definition, concluded that a group is
"two or more persons who are interaccing with one
another in such a manner that eadi. person in£luenccs and is influenced by each other person." When
individuals are interdependent, their outcomes,
actions, thoughts, feelings, and experiences are
determined in part by others in the group.
Some groups create only the potential for interdependence among members. The people standing
ina·queue at the checkout counter in a store, audience members in a darkened. theater, or the congregation of a large mega-church are only minimally
interdependent; but other groups-such as gangs,
families, spons teams, and military squads-create
fa~ higher levels of interdependency since members
reliably and substantially influence one anothds
outcomes over a long period of time and in a variety
of situations. In such groups the influence of one
member on another also tends to be mutual;
member A can influence B, but B can also influence
A in return. In other groups, in contrast, influence
is more unequal and more one-directional. In a
business, for example, the boss may determine how
employees spend their time, what kind of rewards
they experience, and even the duration of their
membership in the group. These employees can
influence their boss to a degree, but the boss's
influence is nearly unilateral.

Interdependence increases the degree of power
the group holds over each member, for the greater
the members' dependence on the group, the more
likely they arc to act in ways that will sustain their
membership-even if that means engaging in
behaviors that they find personally objectionable.
As social exchange theory explains, the greater the
individual members' commitment to the group-with commitment generally increasing with time
spent in ~he group, the costs already incurred by
membership, the level of rewards received from the
group, and the lack of alternative group mcmberships--the greater rhe group's power.

Structure
Moreno (1934), in his analysis of the nature of
groups and their durability, argued that the psychological impact ofa group on its members depends in
large part on the group's structural integrity. He
believed char groups with harmonious attraction
and authority relations among members were likely
to survive and that the individuals in such groups
would be more likely to prosper psychologically.
Groups are structured, rather than unstructured,
when roles, norms, and patterned relations organize
the actions and activities within them. Sherif and
Sherif (1956, p. 144), suggest that these structwal
features are what differentiate a group from a haphazard assortment ofindividuals: "A group is a social
unit which consists of a number of individuals who
stand in (more or less) definite status and role relationships to one another and which possesses a set
of values or norms ofirs own regulating the behavior of individual members."
The more structured the group, the more clearly
defined the aetions taken by specific members.
Many groups are structured by design, for by defining roles, norms, and relations the group and its
founders hope to facilitate goal attainment. But
even without a deliberate attempt at organizing, the
group will probably develop a structure anyway.
Initially, members may consider themselves to be
just members, basically similar to each other. But
over time each group member will tend to perform
a specific range of actions and interact with other
group members in a particular way. The role of
leader emerges in many groups, but other roles .arise
in groups over time. Benne and Sheats (1948), in
one of the earliest analyses of the roles that members
take in groups, concluded that a group, to survive,
must meet two basic demands: it must accomplish
its tasks and the relationships among its members
must be maintained. They suggested that the roles
IJORSYTH
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that frequently emerge in groups match these two
basic needs, with task roles including coordlnator,
claborator, energizer, evaluator-critic, informationgiver, information-seeker, and opinion-giver and
the relational, sodoemotional roles including compromiser, encourager, follower, and harmonizer.
Benne and Sheats also identified a third set of roles:
the individualistic roles occupied by individuals
who stress their own needs over the group's needs.
Norms are the consensual and often implicit
standard that describe what behaviors should and
should not be performed in a given group context
and are part of the group's socially shared structure.
Although agreement among members is often
implicit and taken for granted, only when a degree
of consensus emerges regarding a standard does it
functi6n as a norm. SheriPs (1936) seminal work
confirmed the interpersonal, group-level status of
norms by experimentally creating norms in a laboratory setting. The norms his groups generated had
a reality independent of the individual members
who supported them so that when new members
joined the groups they learned, and subsequently
passed on, the standards that they themselves had
acquired through group interaction.
Roles, norms, and other structural aspects of
groups, although unseen and often unnoticed, lie
at the heart of their most dynamic processes.
Individuals who occupy roles that grant them more
status within the group tend to be more influential,
even when examining issues that fall outside their
areas of expertise. When several members form a
subgroup within the larger group, they exert
more influence on the rest of the group than they
would individually. When people manage to place
themselves at the hub of the group's informationcxchange patterns, their influence over others
increases. As Mordand and Levine (1982) explain
in their theory of group socialization, when people
join a group, they initially spend much of their time
trying to come to terms with the structural requirements of their group. Ifthey cannot meet the group's
demands, they might not remain a member for
long. As their commitment to the group increases
and the group becomes increasingly committed to
the individual, individuals transition into the role of
full member and tend to fulfill the requirements of
their position within the group.

Cohelion
A group is not just the individuals who are members
or even the dyadic pair-bonds that link members to
one another. A group, viewed holistically, is a unified
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whole; an entity formed when interpersonal forces
bind the members together in a single unit with
boundaries that mark who is in the group and who
is outside of it. 1his quality of ''groupness," solidarity, or unity is generally termed cohesion and is a necc5sary, if not sufficient, condition for a group to
exist. A group without cohesion would disintegrate
since forces that keep the group intact are insufficient to counteract the forces that pull the group
apart (Dion, 2000).
Durkheim (189711966, 190011973) discussed
how groups vary in terms of cohesiveness; he proposed that groups with greater solidarity had more
influence over their members. A more formal analysis of cohesion was supplied by Lewin (1948), who
suggested that cohesion involved both individuallevd and group-level processes. At the individual
level, cohesiveness derives from each member's
attraction to other group members, whether this
attraction is based on liking, respect, or trust. At the
group level, cohesiveness reflects that "we-feeling"
that joins people together to form a single unit
(Cartwright, 1968; Festingcr, 1950). Many factors
combine to determine a group's level of cohesiveness, including attraction among members, similarity of members to one another, group size, and
structural features such as the absence ofsubgroups,
a flatter status structure, and so on.
Cohesion is a uniquely group-level concept, for
cohesion comes about if, and only if, a group exists.
Although a group with low levels of cohesiveness
may be a durable one, cohesiveness usually signals
the health of the group. A cohesive group will be
more likely to prosper, over time, since it retains its
members and allows them to reach goals that would
elude a more incoherent aggregate. The group that
lacks cohesion is at risk, for if too many members
drift away, the group may not survive. The concept
of cohesiveness, too, offers insights into some of the
most intriguing questions people ask about groups:
Why do some groups fail to retain their members,
whereas others grow rapidly in size? Why do some
groups stand loyally behind the decisions of their
leaders, whereas the members of other groups dissociate themselves from their group at the first sign
of conflict? When do members put the needs of
their group above their own personal interests?
What is the source of the feeling of confidence and
unity that arises in some groups and not in others?
If one understands the causes and consequences of
cohesion, then one is further along in understanding a host of core processes that occur in groups,
including productivity, members' satisfaction and
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turnover, morale, formation, stability, influence,
and conflict.

Entittztivity (Groupne11)
Groups are real not just in a physical sense but also
in a perceprual sense. Groups arc often construed to
be unified Gestalts whose parts mix together to
form a single thing by members and nonmembers.
Perceivers readily hypostasize groups: They perceive
them to be real and assume that their properties arc
influential ones. Brown (2000, p. 3) considered this
aspect of a group-that members define the group
as real and see themselves as members of it-to be
the sine qua non of a group. He writes: "A group
exists when two or more people define themselves as
members of it and when its existence is recognized
by at least one other." Turner, Hogg. Oakes, Reicher,
and Wetherell (1987, pp. 1-2) similarly suggested
"a psychological group is defined as one that is psychologically significant for the members, to which
tliey relate themselves subjectively fur social comp·arison and the acquisition of norms and values ...
that they privately accept membership in, and which
influences their attitudes and behavior."
Campbell (1958) believed that this aspect of a
group was so essential to understanding how people
perceive groups that he coined the word mtitativity
to describe a group's perceived unity. Entitativity,
as perceived cohesiveness, depends on certain perceptual cues that perceivers rely on intuitively to
decide if an aggregation of individuals is a true
group or just a collection of people. Many aggregiltes of individuals occupying the same physical
location--commuters waiting for a bus or specta·
tors at a sporting event-may lack entitativicy since
they seem to be a disorganized mass of individuals
who happen to be in the same place at the same
time, but if they begin to cheer, express similar
emotions, and move together, they may look more
like a group to those who are observing them.
Entitativity, according to Campbell, is substan·
tially influenced by degree of interdependence
(common fate: Do the individuals experience the
same or interrelated outcomes?), homogeneity
(similarity: Do the individuals perform similar
beh"aviors or resemble one another?), and presence
(proximity: How close together are the individuals
in the aggregation?).
Calling an aggregation a "group" is not mere
labeling. Groups that are high in entitativity tend to
be inoi:e cohesive (Zyphur & Islam, 2006), and
their members also experience enhanced feelings of
social well-being (Sani, Bowe, & Herrera, 2008).

When people believe they are part of a highly entitative group, they are more likely to respond to the
group's normative pressures (Castano, Yzcrbyl, &
Bourguignon, 2003); and this tendency is particularly suong when people feel uncertain about themselves and the correctness of their beliefs (Hogg,
Sherman, Diersclhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007).
The concept of entirativity also helps to explain the
varied reactions people display when they are part of
groups that arc created using technology, such as
conference calls or Internet-mediated connections.
Some members do not consider such groups to be
very entitacive because they lack physical presence,
but others report that such groups are as high in
entitativity as any face-to-face group to which they
belong (Lowry, Roberts, Romano, Cheney, &
Hightower, 2006). Entitatlvity, then, is often in the
eye of the beholder. As Zander and his colleagues
demonstrated many years ago, simply telling a collection ofpeople they constitute a group is sufficient
to uigger intragroup dynamics. When they repeatedly told women working in isolation that they were
nonetheless members of a group, the women
accepted this label and lacer rated themselves more
negatively after their "group" failed (Zander,
Scotland, & Wolfe, 1960).
Entirativity also influen~ nonmembers' perceptions of..the group and its members. Perceivers are
more likely to stereotype specific individuals when
they are members of a group that is thought to be
high in enticativity (Rydell, Hugenbcrg. Ray, &
Mackie, 2007). Observers arc more likely to assume
the members ofsuch groups are highly similar to one
another (Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002)
but different in significant ways from nonmembers
(Pickett, 2001). Their perceptions of such groups
also reveal a tendency toward essmtialism: the belief
that the group has deep, relatively unchanging qualities that give rise to their more surface-level characteristics (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002;
Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004). When people
think that a group is cntitative, they assume that the
group members act as they d<1 because that ls simply
the nature of people who are members of th.at
particular group.

The Significance of Groups
Groups are scientifically, practically, and clinically
significant. Groups-particularly groups with many,
rather than few, of the defining feartires of groups,
including relationships linking a substantial number
ofmembers, boundaries, interdependence, structure,
cohesion, and entirativity-influcncc the thoughts,
F-ORSYTH
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emotions, and actipns of their members, so a scientifically informed understanding of people requires
understanding groups. Groups, as the final section
of this chapter concludes, provide members with
the resources they need to meet the demands they
encounter in a wide range of environmental contexts across the span of their lives.

Group1 and the Need to Belong
Baum~istcr and Leary's (1995) belongingness
hypothesis argues that "human beings have a pervasive drive to form and maintain at least a minimum
quantity oflasting, positive, and impactful interpersonal relationships" (p. 497). Although groups with
superficial relationships among members do not
satisfy this need, members of long term, emotion~
aUy intensive groups--therapeutic groups, support
groups, combat units, and high-demand religious
organizations-display strong bonds between themselves and other group members-to the point of
showing withdrawal when someone leaves the
"family." A psychodynamic perspective suggests that
groups provide a means of regaining the security of
the family by creating emotional ties among members by providing a sense of security like that of a
nurturing parent and making possible relations with
others that are similar in affective cono to sibling
bonds (Freud, 1922; Lee & Robbins.1995).

U>neliness
Studies of people who are socially isolated attest to
the distress caused by too few connections to others.
Loneliness covaries with depression, anxiety, personality disorders, and interpersonal hostility; and
prolonged periods of loneliness have been linked to
such physical illnesses as cirrhosis of the liver, hypertension, heart disease, and leukemia (Hojat & Vogel,
1987; Jon~ & Carver, 1991). Individuals who
are cxtremdy lonely display elevated levels of
Epstein-Barr'Virus and reduced levels of B lymphocytes-characteristics that arc associated with reductions in immunity and increased vulnerability to
mononucleosis (Kiecolt-Glaser, Speicher, Holliday,
& Glaser, 1984). Loneliness is also linked to suicidal thoughts and suicide attempts (Van Orden
et al., 2010).
Individuals who are members of social groups
report less loneliness than individuals with few
memberships. Weiss (1973) draws a distinction
between social loneliness, which occurs when people
lack ties to other people jn general, and emotional
lonelin~the absence of a meaningful, intimate
relationship with another person. Open, transitory
2.8

groups do little to prevent either social or emotional
loneliness; but dosed, highly engaging groups are
sufficient to prevent social loneliness, and a group
with many of the defining characteristics of a group
(relationships, boundaries, interdependence, structure, cohesion, groupness) may mcccmembers emQ.·
tional as well as social needs. People who belong to
more groups and organizations report less loneliness
than those who keep to themselves, and this effect is
stronger for groups with many interconnections
among members (Kraus, Davis, Bazzi.ni, Church, &
Kirchman, 1993; Stokes, 1985) and highly cohesive
ones (Anderson & Martin, 1995; Schmidt &
Sermat, 1983).

Isolation and Rejection
Membership in a group promotes a range ofpositive
social and psychological outcomes, but these benefits
arc not as positive as the effects of exclusion are negative. Voluntary isolation apparently has few negative consequences, but unintended, involuntary
isolarion is associated with emotional instability,
insomrtia, memory lapses, depression, fatigue, and
general confusion (Suedfcld, 1997). Deliberate social
exclusion, or ostracism, has particularly negative
consequences, in part since the isolation from groups
it produces is intentional rather than accidentally
produced. When Williams (2007) asked people who
had peen ostracized to describe themselves, they
used words such as "frustrated," "anxious," "nervous,"
and "lonely." They evidence physiological signs of
stress, including elevated blood pre~ure and cortisol
levels (a stress-related hormone), and brain-imaging
research suggests that the pain of exclusion is ncurological1y similar to pain caused by physical injury
(Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003;
MacDonald & Leary, 2005).
Leary (1990) suggests that people are satisfied
when a group takes them in but a group that actively
seeks them out provides maximal inclusion. In contrast, individuals respond negatively when a group
ignores or avoids them, but maximal exdusionthe group rejects, ostracizes, abandons, or banishes-is particularly punishing (Williams & Sommer,
1997). He and his colleagues found an association
between ostracism and acrs of violence, often aimed
at those group members who were the rejectors
(Leary, Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips. 2003).
Exclusion also influences self-esteem. Leary's
sociometer model, for example, suggests that sclfestecm is not based on private, personal appraisals
of worth. Instead, Leary maintains that "self.
esteem is part ofa sociometer that monitors people's

THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF GROUPS

relational value in other people's eyes,. (Leary, 2007,
p. ..328). Self-esteem drops when exclusion is likely
and is designed to motivate individuals to identify
chc steps they should take to decrease the risk of
social exclusion. In consequence, self-esteem rises
~hen people fed included in groups and liked by
others or when they think about a time when they
were in a group that made chem feel they belonged
(Srivastava & Beer, 2005).

Group1 and Social Support
When people find themselves in stressful, difficult
circumstances, they often cope by forming or joining a group (Dooley & Catalano, 1984). In many
cases support is drawn from dyadic relationships,
such as a single close personal friend or intimate
partner, but in other instances the support stems
from membership in an informally organized friendship group or some other type of social aggregate.
l:iays and Oxley (1986), for example, found that
college students cope with the stresses of entering
college by forming extensive social networks of
peers, which evolve into friendship clusters. Stressful
life. circumstances increase the risk of psychological
and physical illness, but groups can serve as protectiye -buffers against these negative consequences
(.Herbert & Cohen, 1993: Uchino, Cacioppo, &
Kiecolt..Glaser, 1996; Wills, 1991). This buffering
effeGt argues that individuals who arc part ofa group.
may not be able to avoid stressful life events but
they respond more positively when these stressors
befall them.
It should be noted, however, that the bulk of the
research has focused on the effects of support from
friends .and loved ones rather than groups per se.
Heh~, until recently, it has not been possible to distinguish betWCen support drawn from close relationships, such as dyadic relationships or a family
meJllbcr, and support drawn from friendship cliques,
oc:tworks of acquaintances, or social groups such as
dubs, sports teams, church groups, work units, or
sc;lf-help associations. Overall, however, the evidence
suggests that people who belong to groups are
ht'althier than individuals who have few ties to other
p.cople (Strocbc, Stroebc, Abakoumkin, & . Schut,
1996). Work by Stroebe and Stroebc (1996) and
Sugisawa, Llahg. and Llu (1994) even suggests that
group members have longer lives.

Attitude1 and Values
Cooley (1909) drew a broad d,istinction between
two types of groups: primary groups and secondary
groups (or complex groups). Primary groups arc

small, close-knit groups, such as families, friendship
cliques, or neighbors. Stcondary groups arc larger
and more formally organized than primary groups.
Such groups-religious congregations, work groups,
clubs, neighborhood associations, and the like-tend to be shorter in duration and less emotionally
involving. Both of these types of groups provide
members with their attitudes, values, and identities.
Cooley maintained that groups teach members the
skills they need to contribute to the group, provide
chem with the opportunity to discover and internalize the rules that govern social behavior, and let
them practice modifying cheir behavior in response
to social norms and others' Tequirements. Groups
sodalire individual members (Parsons, Bales, &
Shils, 1953).
In most cases, when conflicts over opmions,
choice.s, and lifestyle occur, they can. be traced back
to the socializing effects of groups. Norms in gan~
cncourag~ members to take aggressive actions against
ochers. Adolescent peer cliques pressure members to
take drugs and commit illegal acts. Fraternities insist
chat members engage in unhealthy practices, such as
drinking excessive amounts of alcohol. Work groups
develop such high standards for producth<lty that
members experience unrelieved amounts of stress.
Sororities may convince members to adopt habits
with regard to dieting and exercise that trigger buli·
mia (Crandall, 1988). Some groups can adopt even
more unusual standards, and members may ·come to
accept them. Radical religious groups, fot example.
may be based on beliefs that nonmembers consider
extraordinary but that members accept without
question.
Th~e emergent group norms are sustained by a
common set of group-level informational, normative, and interpersonal processes (Fotsyth, 1990).
Informational in6uencc occurs when the group
provides members with information that they can
use to make decisions and form opinions. People
who join a group whose members accept bizarre
ideas as true will, in time, explain things
in that way as wdL Normative influence occurs
when individuals tailor their actions to fit the
group's norms. Many people take such norms as
"Bribery is wrong" and "Contribute your time and
resources to the community" for granted, but some
societies and some groups have different norms
which are equally powerful and widely accepted.
Normative influence accounts for die transmission
of religious, economic, moral, political, and lnterpersonal attitudes, beliefs, and values across generations. Interpersonal influence is used in those rare
FORSYTH
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instances when someone violates the group's norms.
The individual who publicly violates a group's norm
will likely meet with reproach or even be ostracized
from the group. These three factors-informational, normative, and interpersonal influencecan be readily observed in groups as diverse as
military units, street gangs, college fraternities, and
religious denominations.

Identity
The sclfis often viewed as an aspect of personalitythe outgrowth of ptivate personal experiences and
self-reflection. But the selfis also shaped, in part, by
group-level processes. Just as Freud (1922) believed
that identification causes children to bond with and
imitate their parents, identification with the group
prompts members to bond with, and take on the
characteristics of, their groups. The psychological
experience of group membership is a central premise in social identify theory of groups and intergroup
relations. Tajfel and Turner (1986) and their colleagues originally developed social identity theory
in their studies of intergroup conflict. In their studies they created what they thought were the most
minimal of groups, for their groups were temporary
~emblies of completely unrelated people with no
history, no future, and no real connection to one
another. Yet, they discovered, even in these minimal
conditions, that group members began to identify
with their groups, even to the point of favoring their
group and its members over other groups. The
groups became, very quickly, psychologically real
for members.
Social identity theory suggests the group
becomes represented in each individual member,
so their selves share some qualities in common
(Turner er al., 1987). Brewer and her colleagues
further divide the group-level side of the self into
two components: the relational self and the collective self (Brewer, 2007; Brewer & Gardner, 1996;
Brewer & Chen, 2007). The relationa/ulfis defined
by ties to ·other people, particularly dyadic and
reciprocal roles such as father-son and leaderfollower, whereas the collective se/fis determined by
membership in larger groups and categories if
individuals consider these groups important and
relevant to their self-concept. Individuals may. for
example, come to de.fine themselves as employees
of the place where they work, as dedicated followers of a particular religious group, or as patriotic
citizens of their nation.
People who identify with their groups experience
a strong sense of belonging in their groups and take
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pride in their membership. 'They are more involved
in the group'S activities and willingly help the group
meet its goals (Abrams, Hogg. Hinkle, & Often,
2005). But with the increased identification with
the group comes the tendency to engage in self-stereotyping: the integration of stereotypes pertaining
to the group in one's own self-descriptions (Biernat,
Vescio, & Green, 1996). Social identity is also connected to feelings of self-worth. People who belong
to prestigious groups tend to have higher self·esteem
than those who belong to stigmatized groups
(Brown & Lohr, 1987). However, as Crocker and
Major (1989) noted in their seminal analysis of
stigma, even membership in a socially denigrated
group can sustain self-esteem. In many cases members ofstigmatized groups and minority groups protect their personal appraisals of their groups from
unfair negative stereotypes by rejecting the disparaging clements of their group's label. So long as
individuals believe the groups they belong to are
valuable, they will experience a heightened sense of
personal self-esteem.
The identity-sustaining aspects of group memberships have a downside however. Membership in
a group or social category may provide a social
identity, but it can set in motion the tendency to
derogate members of other groups. Group-based
identities sow the seeds of conflict by creating a
cognitive distinction between "us" and "them."'
According to Tajfel and Turner (1986, p. 13). the
"mere perception of belonging to two distinct
groups--that is, social categorization per se--is
sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in group." Groups thus sustain individual
members' self-esteem but at the cost ofcreating ctni·
mosity toward those who belong to other groups.

GoalAttainment
Groups, in addition to yielding substantial psychological benefits for members, are the means by
which most of the world's work is accomplished.
Although the accomplishments oflone explorers are
often highlighted by historians-Columbus, Marco
Polo, Sir Edumund Hillary-these individuals were
supported in their efforts by groups. Most inven..
tions are not developed by single individuals working in isolation but by teams of collaborators. In
some cases even great artis~such as the impressionists and da Vinci-produced their works as
members of groups. A hundred years ago single
craftspeople created commodities which were then
sold to others, but in modern times most things
are built by groups. Groups also make nearly all
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decisions-at lease ones dealing with comploc or
consequential matters.
McGrath (1984) uses two dimensions (generate/
negotiate and choose/execute) to generate an eightcategory typology of group goals. Generating groups
concoct strategies to be used to accomplish their
goals (planning tasks) or to create altogether new
ideas and approaches to problems (creativity tasks).
Choosing groups make decisions about issues that
have correct solutions (intelkctivt tasks) or answer
tomplex questions that defy simple solution (decision~making tasks). Negotiating groups must resolve
differences of opinion among members regarding
their goals or decisions (cognitive conflict tasks) or
resolve competitive disputes among members (mixe~
motive tasks). Executing groups do things, including
competing against other groups (contest:slbattks!compe-titiw tasks) or working together to create some
product or carry out actions that require coordinated
effort (performanceslpsychomotor ta!ks). McGrath's
model thus distinguishes between conceprualbehavioral goals and purely collaborative goalsthey require that group members work together to
accomplish their goals-versus those that pit indi·
viduals and/or groups against each other.

Adopting the Group-level Perspective:
Future Directions
Twentieth-century theorists, researchers, and practitioners made great strides in their quest to understand human behavior. They maintained· that
individuals arc psychologically complex, that that
their inner mental life can be described and examined systematically, and that issues of psychological
adjustment and dysfunction arc determined, in
large part, by such psychological states and processes
as needs, motivations, thoughts, personality, and
perceptions. As Baars (1986, p. 412) concluded,
':psychodynamic thought, broadly conceived, has
probably provided the richest and most humanly
rClevant vein of psychological theorizing in the century." What is the next step that will be taken in the
an;uysis of the human condition?

What Level ofAtudysuf
A multilevel approach recommends augmenting the
individual-level perspective wirh other perspeetlves,
including one that focuses squarely on groups and
group processes. At the level of the individual, people's actions, thoughts, and emotions cannot be
understood without taking into consideration the
groups they bdong to and the groups that surround
them. Culturally, all kinds of societies-hunting/

gathering, horticultural, pastoral, industrial, and
postindustrial-are defined by the characteristics of
the small groups chat compose them. On a practical
level, much of the world's work is done by groups,
so enhanced understanding of their dynamics may
mean they can be designed to be ~fficient. To
improve productivity in a factory, problem solving
in a boardroom, or learning in the classroom, one
must understand groups.

What Discipline Will Take Responsibility
for the Study ofGroups?
A multUevcl approach requires chat researchers share
the study of groups with researchers in a variety of
scientific disciplines and professions. Groups are
and will contimre to be studied in psychology, sod·
ology, communication studies, business, political
science, economics, and anthropology; but in many
cases researchers in these fields are not mindful of
one another's work. By tradition, researchers tend to
publish their finding8 in their own discipline's journals and to present their findings at conferences
with colleagues from their own fields but only rarely
explore connections between their work and the
work being done in other disciplines. Since no one
discipline can claim the study of groups as its rightful domain, future investigators should strive. to
adopt a multidisciplinary, as well as a multilevel,
perspective on groups, and changes in communication across fields should facilitate that process.

W'Jl Groups Continue to Be Influential!
Political scientist Robert Putnam (2000) wrote, in
his whimsically citied book BowlingAlont, about the
declining frequency of traditional groups. His analyses suggested chat, since the 1960s1 the number of
groups and people's involvement in groups have
steadily declined. He did not fully consider, however, changes in the nature of groups chat have
occurred recently. Interest in some types ofgroups-community groups, fraternal and professional
organizations, or even church-based groups-has
decreased, but other types of groups-book groups,
support groups, teams at work, and so on-have
taken their place. In fact, even though Putnam's
book title suggests chat people arc bowling alone
rather than in groups, bowling remains a popular
social activity, for hardly anyone bowls alone. They
now bowl with friends, coworkers, and family members. Given that the desire to join groups is likely
woven into humans' genetic makeup, it is likely that
groups-in one form or another-will continue to
play a cencral role in human existence.
FORSYTH
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Will Group-LevelApproaches Gain
Mommtumf
In 1950 Slavson predicted thar group therapy would
largely replace individual merhods of rreatment. In
1954 Bogardus predicted that researchers would
soon develop extensive measures of group personality and that groupality would become as important
a concept in group psychology as personality is in
individual psychology. In 1974 Steiner predicted
that the 1980s would see groups emerge as the centerpiece of social psychology.
These predictions have not been fully confirmed.
Group approaches have proven themselves to be
effective, but they arc nor the preferred mode of
treatment for most therapists and clients (Durkin,
1999). Concepts like groupality. and synrality have
failed to generate theoretical unity or empirical
interest. The surge ofinrerest in groups predicted by
Steiner did not occur, for groups arc understudied
relative to such topics as personality, social cognition, attitudes, and relationships (Wittcnbaum &
Moreland, 2008).
What does the future hold for the group.Jevcl
approaches to understanding human adjustment
and well-being? .Although the course of science,
because of its stress on discovery and innovation,
is difficult to predict,. the contents of this volume
suggest that group-level approaches are garnering
increased interest among theorists, researchers, and
practitioners. Past theoretical, empirical, and applied
work has built a swrdy foundation for the continued
development of the study of groups. Interest in
meso- and macro-level pro«S.Ses has inaeased
steadily in recent years, suggesting that a purely individualistic orientation is giving way to a multilevel
orientation. Therapeutic applications that utilii.c a
group setting are becoming increasingly common,
and empirical Studies of their utility have docu~
mcnted their therapeutic effectiveness (Burlingame,
MacKenzie, & Strauss, 2004). As theorists, research·
ers, and practitioners confirm the central importance
of groups in people's lives, people will in time begin
to think of themselves as group members first and
individuals second (Forsyth, 2000).

References
Abrams, D., Hogg. M. A., Hinkle, S., & Often, S. (2005).
The social identity perspective on small groups. In M. S.
Poole & A. B. Hollingshead {Eds.), 1htories ofs1't4/Jgroups:
lntmli1dp/i114ry pmptcrit1ts (pp. 99-137). Thousand Oaks,

CA: Sage.
Adkr, P. A., Kless, S. }., & Adler, P. (1992). Socialization to
gender roles: Popularity among elementary school boys and
girls. Sociology ofEducation, 65, 169-187.

~2.

Allport, F. H. (1924). Soda/ psycholo!J. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
Anderson, C. M., & Martin, M. M. (1995). The effects ofcommunication motives, interaction involvement, and loneliness
on satisfu.ction: A model of small groups. Small Group
&search, 26, 11 S-137.
Asch. S. E. (19.57). An experimental investigation ofgroup Influence. In Symposium on pnventiw and social psychiatry.
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
Baars, B. J. (1986). 1he cognitiw M)()/ution Jn psychowgy. New
York: Guilford.
Baumeister, R. F., & Lc:uy, M. R. (1995). The need to belong:
Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental
, human motivation. Psycho/ogi(IJ/ Bu!ktin, 117, 497-529.
Benne, K. D .. & Sheats, P. (1948). Functional rolc.s of group
mcrrJJers. journal ofSociaJ lssue1, 4, 41-49.
Biernat, M., Vescio, T. K, & Green, M. L. (1996). Selective &elfstercotyping.Jtmma/ ofPt1101Ul{jty and SMal Psychology, 71,
1194-1209.
Bog;udus, E. S. (1954). Group behavior and groupality. SocitJlbgy
and SocW Rtsearch, 38, 401-403.
·
Brewer, M. B. (2007). Tue.social psychology of intergroup relations: Social categorization, ingroup bias, and outgroup
prejudice. In A- W. Kruglanski & E.T. Higgins (Eds.), Social
psychoWg,: Handb()()lr of basic principles (2nd ed., pp. 695715). New York: Guilford.
Brewer, M. S .. & Chen, Y. {2007). Where (who) are collectives
in collectivism? Toward conceptual clarification ofindividualism and collectivism. A]cho/ogical Review, l U, 133-151.
Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this "We•? Levels
of collective identity and self tcpR:SCntations. Journal of
Pmonalil] and Soda/ Psych~wgy, 71, 83-93.
Brown, B. B., & Lohr, N. (1987). Peer group affiliation lllld adolescent self~tcem: An integration of ego-identity and symbolic-interaction theories. journal of Pmo1Ullity and Social
Psychowgy, 52, 47-55.
Brown, R. (2000). Group procma: Dpamics wilhin and ~m
groups (2nd td.). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Burlingame, G. M., MacKenzie, K. R., & Strauss, B. (2004).
Small group treatment: Evidence for effectiveness and mechanisms ofchange. In M.J. Lambert (Ed.),Bugin &Garfie/J's
handhoolr ofpsychothmzpy and bthavwr changt (5th ed., pp.
647-696). New York: Wiley & Sons.
Campbell, D. T. (1958). Common fate, similarity, and other
indices of the status ofaggregates of persons as social entities.
Bthaviorr:l Sdm«, 3, 14-25.
Cartwright; D. (1968). The nature ofgroup cohesiveness. In D.
Cartwright & A- Zander (Eds.), Group dynamics: Research
and theory {3rd ed., pp. 91-109). New York: Harper &
Row.
Cartwright, D., & Zander, A (Eds.). (1968). Group t!J114111ic1:
Rt:mzrth and theory (3rd. ed.). New York: Harper & Row.
Castano, £., Yzcrbyt, V., & Bourguignon, D. (2003). We arc one
and I liltt it: The impact of ingroup cntltativity on ingroup
identification. EUl"()pemi journal of Soda/ Prycho/Qgy, 33,

735-754.
Cattell, R. B. (1948). Conc.epts and methods in the measwc-ment of group syntality. Psychofatjcai Rrvittu, 55, 48-63.
Coan, R. W. (1968). Dimensions of psychological theory.
Ammcan Ptychowgist, 23, 715-722.
Cooley, C.H. (1909). Social organiurion. New York: Scribner.
Crandall, C. S. (1988). Social contagion of binge eating.Jountlll
ofPmona/ity and Social Prycho/og], 55, 58S-598.

THE N.ATURB AND SIGNIFICANCE OF GROUPS

Crawford, M. T., Sherman, S. J., & Hamilton, D. L (2002).
Perceived enritativity. Stereotype formation, and the interchangeability of group members. jqurruzl of PmoNtliJy 11nd
Soria/Psychology,83, 1076-1094.
Crocker, J., &: Major, B. (1989). Social stigma and sc!f-cnccm:
The self-protective properties of litigma. Psyrho/ogiCll/ Review,
96, 608--630.
Darley, J. M. (1992). Social organization for the production of
evil. Psycho/Qgic11l !nquiry, 3, 199-218.
Dion, K. L (2000). Group cohesion: From •fidd of furcei' to
multidimc:nsional construct. Group D]n4mia: Theory.
Rmarch, and Practict, ./, 7-26.
Dooley. D., & Catalano, R. (1984). The epidemiology of economic mess. ~rican Journ41 ofCommunity Psyrho/Dgy, 12,
387-409.
Dunbar, R. I. M. (2008). Cognitive constrainu on the structure
and dynamics of social networks. Group Dynamks: 1htory.
Rmar.h, and Practict, 12, 7-16.
Durkheim, Jl (1966). Suic/Je. New York: Pree Press. (Original
work'published 1897)
Durkheim, (1973). Emile Durkhtim on morality and sodtty.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1900)
Durkin, J. N. (1999). Group psycl\otherapy's big problem, group
psychotherapy'• little secret. Group Psycho/qgist, 9(1), 7-8.
Eisenberger, N. I., Lieberman, M. D., & Williams, K. D. (2003).
Docs rejection hurt? All fMRI study of social exclusion.
Sdmu, 302, 290-292.
Fescingcr, L (1950). lmormal socialcommunication. Psycho/QgiCllJ
Rrvitw, 51. 271-282.
Forsyth. D. R. (1990). The pecking order. In R. Brown (Ed.),
Human b1havior: H()llJ pups
(Vol. 15, pp. 1820-1827).
New York: Marshall Cavcnduh.
Forsyth, D. R. (2000). The social psycliology of groups and
group psythotherapy: One view of the nat c:ennuy. Group.
24, 147-155.
Forsyth, D.R. (2010). Group apu:mics (5th ed.). Belmont, Ck
Cengage.
Fo!Syth, D.R., & Leary, M. R. (1991). Mctatheorctical and epistemological issues. In C. R. Snyder & D. R. Forsyth (Eds.),

:e.

rum

Handbo()k of1ocilll and clinicalpsychology: 1ht htalth pmptcriw (pp. 757- 773). New York: Pergamon.
Freud, S. (1922). Group psychowgy and tht analysis ef tht tgo
0. Strachey. Trans.). London: Hogarth PICSS and the Instirutc
of Psycho-Analysis.
GUbcrt, D. T. (1998). Ordinary penouology. In D. T. Gilbert.
S. T. FIAc, & G. Undzcy (Eds.), 1hc handbook ofsodllJpS]Cho/ogy (4th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 89-150). New York: McGr.iw-Hill.
Harris, J. R. (1995). Where is the child's environment? A group
socialization theory of development. Psycholbffeal Rndtw,
102, 458-489.
Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D. (2002). kc essentialist
beliefs assodatcd with prejudice? BrllUh journal of Social
PsychobJgy, 41, 87-100.
Hays, R. B., & Oxley. D. (198~. Social network development
and functioning during a life transition. jqurruz/()/Pmonality
and Social Psyrho/Dgy, 50, 304-313.
Herbert, T. B., & Cohen, S. (1993). Stress anci immunity in
humans: A meta-analytic review. Psychosomatk Mtdicint, 55,
364-379.
Hogg, M. A. (1992). 7he social psychology ofgroup cr1htJi11t11ess:
From attrrlelkn fQ sorial idmtity. New York: New York
University Press.

Hogg, M.A., Sherrmn, D. K., Dlersclhuis, J., Maimer, AT., &
Moffitt. G. (2007). Uncertalnty. endtativity, and group
idcntlbc:ation. Jounuz/ ofF.xpmmmtal Sod4/ Itycho!cgy, 43,
135-142.
Hojat, M., &Vogel, W. H. (198n. Socloemotional bondingand
neurobiochemisuy. journal ()/Sorilll Bthltvior & Pmonality,
2, 135-144.
Joiner, T. E., Jr., Brown, J. S., & Wingate, L. R. (2005). The
psychology and neurobiology of suicidal behavior. Mmllll
Rntitwofl'Jycholcgy. 56. 287-314.
Jones, W. H., & Carver, M. D. (1991). Adjusanent and coping
implicarlons offondines.s. In C.R. Snyder & D.R. Forsyth
(Eds.). Handhoo! ofsoci4l and cliniclll psychq/ogy: 7ht !mt/th
pmptctivt (pp. 395-415). New York: Pergamon.
Kdly, J. R. (2004). M'ood and emorion in groups. In M. B.
Brewer & M. Hewstone (Eds.), Emotion mu/motivation (pp.
95-112). Malden, MA: Bla.ckwcll.
Kerr, N. L., & Tmdalc:, R. S. (2004). Group performance and
decision malclng. Annual &view ofPsychology. 55, 623-655.
Kiecolt-Glascr, J. K., Speicher, C. E., Holliday, J. E., & Glaser, R.
(1984). Suess and the tr.l.llSformarion of lymphocytes by
Epstein-Barr virus.joumai~fBthatlior11/ Mtdidne, 7, 1-12.
Kraus, L. A., Davis, M. H., &zuni, D. G., Church, M., &
Kirchman, C. M. (1993). Personal and social influences on
loneliness: The mediating effect of social provisions. Socilll
Psycho/Dgy Qµarttrly, 56, 37-53.
Kushner, H. I., & Sterk, C. E. (2005). The limiu of social capital: Durkheim, suicide, and social cohesion. AmtriaznJournal
ofPublic Htalth, 95. 1139-1143.
Leary, M. R. (1990). Responses to social exclusion: Social anxiety. Jealo~. loneliness, depression, and low self-esteem.
Journal ofSod41 & Clinical Psychology, 9, 221-229.
Leary. M. R. (2007). Motivational and emotlonal aspects of the
self. Anniuzl Revinu ofPsychology, 58, 317-344.
Leary, M. R., Kowalski, R. M., Smith, L, & Phillips. S. (2003).
Teasing. rejection, and violence: Case studies of the school
shootinp. Ag;rmiot Bthavior, 29, 202-214.
Le Bon, G. (1960). 1ht CTOwd: A study oftht pop.Jar mind. New
York: Vt.king Press. (Original work publis'hed i895)
Lee, R. M., & Robbins, S. B. (1995). M.casuring belongingness:
The social connectednc:ss and the social assurance scales.
Journal ofCounstling AycholotJ, 42, 232-241.
Lewin, K. (1948). &wiving soda/ '°nj/icts: Slftcud paptn on
group Jynamia. New York: Harper.
Lewin, K. (1951). Reid tht()I'} in soda/ sdmct. New York: Harper.
Lowry, P. B., Roberts, T. L, Romano, N. C., Jr., Cheney,
P. D., & Highrowcr, R. T. (2006). The impact of group slz.e
and social p~ncc on small-group communication: Does
computer-mediated communication make a difference?
Small Group &starch, 37. 631-661.
MacDonald, G., & Leary, M. R (2005). Why docs social exclusion hun? The relationship bccween social and physical pain.
Psychological Bulkrin, 131, 202-223.
McDougall, W. (1908). An Introduction to sod41 psyrhology.
London: Me1huen.
McGrath. J. F.. (1984). Groups: ln1'radion and P"fomumrt.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: 1>rcndce Hall.
Moreland, R. L., & Levine, J. M. (1982). Socialization in small
groups: Temporal changes in individual-group i:datlons.
AJ11ancts in E:qmimmtal Soci4l Psychol4gy, JS, 137-192.
Moreno, J. L. (1934). 'tno shall surviw? A new 11pproarh ro rht
probkm ofhuman inttmfations. Washington, DC: Nervous
and Meneal Di.sc2sc Publishing.

POR.SYTH

33

Newe-0mb, T. M. (1943). Pmon4lityan1'1ocialchangr. New York:
Dryden.
Nolan, J.M., Schula., P. W., Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J., &
Grisk.c:vicius, V. (2008). Normative social influence is
underdeteaed. Pmo1111/ity and Sod/II Psychology Bulktin,
34, 913-923.
Norman, W. T. (1963). Towani an adequate wconomy of per·
sonality attributes: ~plicated factor structure in peer nomination personality ratings. f oumai of AbnomuJ llnll SodaJ
PtJcho/Qgy, 66, 574-583.
Parsons, T., Bales, R. E, & Shils, E. (Eds.). (1953). WOr.king
pllpm in the theory ofllCIWn. New York: Free Press.
Pepitone, A. (1981). Lessons from the history of social psychol·
ogy. American Psychologist, 36, 972-985.
Pickett, C. L. {2001 ). The effect ofcndtativity bdic& o n impUcit
comparisons between group members. Personality and Social
J>rychology Bu/ktin, 27, 515-525.
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bflwling alone: Tht rollapst anJ rtllilNll of
Ammcan commrmity. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Rosenberg, S., & Gara. M. A. (1983). Contemporary pcrspcc·
tivcs and futwc directions of personality and social psychology.]oumal ofPerso11dlity and Social Psycho/Qgy, 45, 57-73.
~. L. (1977). The intuitiye psythologist and his shortcomin~:
Distortions in the attribution process. Ativances in
.ExptrimrotalSodaJ Psychology, J0, 173-220.
Rydell, R.}., Hugenbcrg, K., Ray, D .. & Mackie, D. M. (2007).
Implicit theories about groups and stereotyping: The role of
group cnritativicy. PmflMlity and Sod/I/ Psychology Bulletin,
33, 549-558.
Sandclands, L., & St. Clair, L. (1993). Toward an empirical concept of group. jouT'7111l for the 7heory ofSocial Behavior, 23,
423-458.
Sani, F., Bowe, M., & Herrera. M•. (2008). Perceived collective
conrinuicy and social well-being: Exploring the connections.
European ]otmllll ofSod/I/ Ptycho/qgy, 38, 365-374.
Sarason, S. B. (1981). An asocial psychology and a misdirected
clinical psychology. American Psychologist, 36, 827-836.
Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962). Cognitive, social, and physi·
ological determinants of emotional state. Psychological
Rrukw, 69, 379-399.
'
Schmidt, N., & Scrmat, V. (1983). Measuring loneliness in dlf·
fi:tcnt relationships. ]t!U1'1llll of Peno114/ity and Social
Psychology, 44, 1038-1047.
Shaw, M. R. (1981). Group dynamics: TIN psychology of small
group befuviqr (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw·Hlll.
Sherif. M. (1936). 'The psycho/Qgy of social norms. New York:
Harper & Row.
Sherif. M., & Sherif. C. W. (1956). An ou.tline flfsodlll pJyCholoiJ
(rev. ed.). New York: Harper & Row.
Slavson, S. R. (1950). Group psythotherapy. Sckntific.Amtrican,

183, 42-45.
Smith. E. R., Se~r, C.R., & Mackie, D. M. (2007). Can emotions be truly group level? Evidence r~ng four conceptual criteria. Journal ofPmona/ity and Social Psycholqgy, 93,

431-446.
Srivastava. S., & Beer, J. S. (2005). How sclf~uarions tdatc to
being liked by others: Integrating sociomcter and attachment
perspectives. journal ofPmonality and Sod41 Psychology, 89,
966-977.
Steiner, I. 0 . (1974). Whatever happened to the group in .social
psychology? Journal of .Exptrimrotal Social Psychology, IO,
94-108.

34

Stokes, J. P. (1985). The relation of social necwork and indMdual
difference variables to loneliness. fournlll of Personality 1Znd
Social Piycho/ogy, 48, 981-990.
Strocbe, W., & Strocbe, M. (1996). The social psychology of
social support. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.),
Social psychology: Handb()()k ofbaneprincipfts (pp. 597~21).
New York: Guilford Press.
Suocbe, W., Strocbe, M. S., Abakoumkin, G., & Schut, H.
(1996). The role of loneliness and social support in adjust·
ment to loss: A test ofattachment versus strcs:ii theory. Journal
ofPersonality and S«Uzl Prycholoo. 70, 1241-1249.
Suedfdd, P. (1997). The social psychology of "invictus~:
Conceptual and methodological approaches to indomitability. [n C. McGarty & S. A. Haslam (Eds.), 1ht mmllge qf
sod/IIpsycholoiJ: Pmptm11t1 on mindin socitlJ (pp. 329-341).
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Sugisawa, H., Liang, J., & Uu, X. (1994). Social networks, social
suppon, and mortality among older people in Japan. fqumals
ofGtrq~logy. 49, S3-S13.
Tajfd, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of
intergroup behavior. In S. Worchd & W. G. Austin (Eds.),
Prychfllogyofinttrgroup rtlarwns (2nd ed•• pp. 7-24). Chicago:
Nelson-Hall.
Thibaut,]. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). 'lbtsodaJpsycholoo of
groups. New York: Wiley.
Triandls, H. C., McCusker, C., & Hui. C. H. (1990).
Mulcimcrhod probes of individualism and collectivism.
fourn1tl ofPmo11111ity and Sod/II Prycho/Qgy, 59, 1006-1013.
Triandis, H. C., & Suh, E. M. (2002). Cultural influences on
personality. AnnUlll&tMw ofPsychology, 53, 133-160.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J.. Reicher, S. 0., &
Wetherell, M. S. (1987). &Jisc011tring the soci!Jl group: A 1e/f
Clltegorizalion 1h~ry. Cambridge, MA: Basil Bladtwell.
Uchino, B. N., Cacioppo,]. T., & Kiecolt-Glascr. J. K. (1996).
The relationship between social support and physiological
processes: A review with emphasis on underlying mechanisms and implications for health. Psychological Buitdin, 119,

488-531.
Urban, H. B. (1983). Phenomenological humanistic approaches.
In M. Hersen, A. E. Kazdin, & A. S. Bellack (Eds.), 7ht
cUnkal psychology handbook (pp. 155-175). New .York:
Pergamon.
Van Ordcn, K. A., Witte; T. K., Cukrowicz, K. C., Braithwaite,
S. R.., Selby, E. A., & Joiner, T. E., Jr. (2010). The interper·
sonal theory of suicide. Psychological &view, 117, 575-600.
Watson, R. I. (1967). Psychology: A prescriptive science.
American Psychologist. 22, 435-443.
Weiss, R.. S. (1973). Loneliness: The exptritnce ofemotional and
sod/I/ isQl.tttion. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.
Wtldschut, T., Pinter, B., Vevea,]. L, lnsko, C. A , & Schopler,
J. (2003). Beyond the group mind: A quantitative review of
the interindividual-inn:rgroup discontinuicy effect.
Psychological Bulktin, 129, 698-722.
Williams, K. D. (2007). Ostracism. Annual Review ofPsychology,

58, 425-452.
Williams, IC. D., & Sommer, K. L (1997). Social ostraeism by
cowo;kers: Does rejection lead to loafing or compcnsadon?
Pmonality andSocial Ps]cho/ogy Bulletin, 23, 693-706.
Wills, T. A. (1991). Social comparison processes in coping and
health. In C. R. Snyder & D. R. Forsyth (Eds.), Htlndboolt of
social muJ clinical psychology: 7ht health pertp«tivt (pp. 376394). Elmsford, NY: Pergamon.

THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF GROUPS

Wittenbaum, G. M., & Moreland, R. L. (2008). Small group
research in social psychology; Topics and trends over time.
Sod414n4 Pmonlllil] Psychology Omfll.SJ, 2, 187-203.
Yurbyt. V., Judd, C. M., & Corneille, 0. (Eds.). (2004). Tht

Ziller, R. C. (1965). Toward a theory of open and dosed groups.
Prycho/ogk4/ Bulletin, 64, 164-182.
Zyphur, M. ]., & Islam, G. (2006). T11Ward undmtatuling 1ht
txbtmct ofuuups:. ~ rtltuionship bttwmi climatt Jtrrngth

psychology ofgr""p perrtption: Pnrtiwtl wzrillhllity. mtitativity. 11ntl asmlilllinn. New York: Psychology Press.

4n4 mlil4tillily (lBMEC Working Paper WPE-12-2006).

Zander, A., Stotland, E., & Wolfe, D. (1960). Unity of group.
identification with group, and .sdf-csrecm of members.
foun111/ ofPmonality, 28, 463-478.

Rl:tri~d

December 15, 2008, from http://www.ibmcap.

cdu.br/

FORSYTH

35

